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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the social dynamics of unilaterally determined social 
responsibility standards. These are put in the context of large customers in a supply 
chain determining company-specific standards, compliance with which is then a 
requirement for suppliers. We draw a brief comparison between multilaterally derived 
standards (such as those determined by the International Standards Organization) and 
unilaterally derived standards. Notably, there is an important difference stemming from 
the level of involvement and degree of control which the unilateral standard-setter has 
throughout the standard creation and implementation process. Indeed, we claim that the 
unilateral standard-setter which requires supplier compliance acts as regulator, monitor, 
and applier of sanctions to those supplier organizations. Ultimately, this puts the large 
corporation in the role of a Corporate Social Watchdog. In closing the paper we 
consider a future research agenda for this new concept 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The way in which we are to understand the social role of the corporation has received 
renewed attention in the light of Matten and Crane’s (2005) work on the corporation as 
the administrator of citizenship rights, taking on activities seen traditionally as the 
domain of governments. While their arguments have been criticised (van Oosterhout, 
2005), the controlling and powerful position of large corporations is widely accepted 
(Nace, 2003).  This sometimes overwhelming power is the starting point for the current 
paper, with a special focus on the role corporations play in terms of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) standards. While it is a contested concept (Lockett, et al., 2006), a 
consensus of sorts has been reached on the core characteristics of CSR. These are that it 
is voluntary, involves internalizing or managing externalities, encompassing a multiple 
stakeholder orientation, with alignment of social and economic responsibilities, includes 
both practices and values and goes beyond philanthropy (Crane, Matten and Spence, 
2008, 7-8).     
 
The context for this conceptual paper is the supply chain. Supply chains are important 
because they are a means of achieving competitive advantage and enhancing 
organizational performance “since competition is no longer between organizations, but 
among supply chains” (Li et al, 2006). It is our contention that to understand the social 
dynamics of the use of standards in the supply chain we need to take a closer look at the 
role of the large corporation than has hitherto been the case. Supply chains vary 
considerably, but we are interested here in the role of large, relatively powerful 
customer organisations requiring adherence to ethical and CSR standards by their 
suppliers. This is in keeping with Matten and Crane’s (2005) notion that governing 
power over others – stakeholders outside the organisation in this case - is held at the 
corporate level.  We introduce the concept of the Corporate Social Watchdog to 
describe and analyse the common pattern of the use of unilaterally determined standards 
to control CSR and ethics in the supply chain. We expand the consideration of the 
dynamics of standards ultimately to include the perspective of the large firm (customer 
in the supply chain) as regulator (determining the necessary standard), policer 
(monitoring activities and identifying possible cases of non-compliance) and - to stretch 
the point - judge and jury (determining guilt and handing down punishment).  The 
paper’s contribution is primarily in investigating in detail the social dynamics of the 
unilaterally rather than the multilaterally derived standard, and introducing the concept 
of the Corporate Social Watchdog as a way of framing the role of the large corporate 
customer in the supply chain. 
 
 4
 
 
The paper is organised as follows. First, the status of unilaterally determined standards 
as part of the range of social responsibility standards available to a corporation is 
discussed, and a comparison made between the characteristics of multilaterally and 
unilaterally derived standards. Second, a brief overview is given of some of the main 
standards for social responsibility. Then we describe the Corporate Social Watchdog 
framework as a mechanism for understanding the role of the large corporate customer in 
applying social standards to their supply chain and requiring compliance. We conclude 
with a research agenda.   
 
UNDERSTANDING UNILATERAL STANDARDS AS ‘STANDARDS’ 
 
Standards have gained credibility and prevalence in both organisational practice and 
organisational studies. They range from highly technical engineering specifications to 
recommendations for processes and procedures, and from the ubiquitous (such as the 
International Standards Book Number) to the relatively obscure. Brunsson and 
Jacobsson summarize this range as covering standards about being something, doing 
something or having something (2000, p.4). While the definition of a standard varies, 
essential characteristics entail a written statement of specifications in order to meet the 
standard, a degree of voluntarismi (Seidl, 2007, p. 707), and that the standard be 
transmitted widely – if successful – to multiple actors and has the intention of co-
ordinating and clarifying complexity (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000, p.16) especially 
across borders.  There is some debate as to the distinction between norms, directives, 
rules (formal and informal) and codes of behaviour (Terlaak, 2007), though it is not our 
purpose to problematize this further here.   
 
Cramer (2005, p.72) describes three different approaches to determining standards: 
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral. Bilateral standards might be agreed, for example 
between company and trade unions. Multilateral standards have received by far the most 
academic attention (at least descriptively if not analytically (Gilbert and Rasche, 2007, 
p.756)) and include the International Standards Organisation.ii  Research on the 
application of multilateral standards include Beck and Walgenback (2005) and Casper 
and Hanckj (1999) on quality and ISO 9000; Walton et al (1998) and Jiang and Bansal 
(2003) on environmental management and IS0 14000; Blind and Gauch (2008) on ICT 
standards; Gilbert and Rasche, 2007 and Göbbels and Jonker (2003) on ethics and 
accountability standards including the Global Reporting Initiative, SA8000 and 
AA1000. However, unilateral standards are, we argue, also important to understand 
because they are presented by individual companies as of equal relevance as 
international standards. Unilateral standards sometimes incorporate aspects of 
multilateral standards but adapt them to the specific context and operate in much the 
same way acting as a mechanism of control. For example, the UK retailer The John 
Lewis Partnership references several International Labour Organisation conventions in 
its Responsible Sourcing Code of Practiceiii. There are important nuances, however, in 
company-specific, unilateral standards which affect the dynamics of their establishment 
and implementation, and it is these which are of particular interest here. The type of 
thing we are referring to is classically the standards (e.g. technical quality, 
environmental, social) required by large customers from their suppliers (Brunsson and 
Jacobsson, 2000, p.6), although there may be wider examples. For instance, Camelot 
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(the UK lottery organisation)iv requires its retail customers who sell the lottery ticket 
product lines to follow its environmental and social standards (Spence, 2006).  
 
The key differences between, for example, an internationally recognised multilaterally 
agreed standard determined and published by the ISO and a company-specific unilateral 
standard are as outlined in Table I. It is these elements which provide the context for the 
conceptual discussion below.  
 
<Insert Table I here> 
  
The differences outlined in Table 1 are evidently underpinned by the fact that the large 
company has control over all aspects of the standard. They are responsible for 
determining whether a standard is necessary, what it should entail, who should write it 
and have an input, the degree of institutionalisation required (i.e. who must comply with 
the standard), instructing (if not doing) auditing, assessing compliance and ultimately 
determining and issuing sanctions for non-compliance. It might be suggested that the 
degree of control of the standard makes it sufficiently different not to be treated in the 
same way as multilateral standards. However, we argue that the unilateral standard is 
simply another standard-type which needs to be taken into account particularly in the 
light of the special dynamics surrounding it in relation to a more independently created 
and implemented standard.  
 
As we have noted, Matten and Crane (2005) acknowledge corporations as 
administrators of citizenship rights. They focus in their discussion primarily on 
employees and community members as, effectively, citizens of the corporation.  In the 
same vein, we argue that we must acknowledge that corporations have a role as 
unilateral standard setters and purveyors, acting to their suppliers and potential suppliers 
as NGO standard-setting bodies do in a broader sense. As with the case of Corporate 
Citizenship, however, corporations prove to have more power and a further reach than 
the body whose activities they reproduce (i.e. governments/NGOS) and in some 
circumstances replace and surpass them. Indeed if, as Hamann et al. (2005: 14) argue, 
the supply chain is the most important pressure for most small suppliers to engage with 
CSR, then large corporate customers could be perceived as having a duty to attend to 
the social responsibility failings that others cannot promote with such success. The 
question is still open, however, as to the best way to act on that responsibility.  
 
 
STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
A wide range of international standards and guidelines on Corporate Social 
Responsibility have been developed which provide practical rules regarding how it can 
best be implemented within business organizations (Cramer, 2005: 71). These culminate 
in the ISO2006 Social Responsibility standard due for publication in 2010 (ISO, 2008). 
It will provide “guidance, not requirements” (op cit, p.2) and therefore won’t be 
certifiable.  ISO20006 will be consistent with the other international leaders in terms of 
CSR standards, that is, the International Labour Organization’s labour standards, the 
United Nations Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development guidelinesv. The UN Global Compact is the world’s largest voluntary 
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network consisting of ten principles relating to human rights, labour rights, 
environmental protection, and transparency (Cetindamar, and Husoy, 2007, p.167) and 
has the clear target and some degree of success in reaching developing countries and 
small and medium sized enterprises.  SA8000 similarly proposes 8 central guidelines, 
particularly on workplace conditions. The Global Reporting Initiative is distinctive in 
that it requires stakeholder dialogue, and the Fair Labour Association, unsurprisingly, 
focuses on 9 principles relating to working conditions (Gilbert and Rasche, 2007, 
p.760). 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, this growing array of social responsibility standards, 
individual firms do sometimes wish to create their own standards. It is not the purpose 
of this paper to uncover why this is in more detail, but to explore the implications of this 
unilateral standard-setting in the supply chain.  
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the distinction between multilateral and 
unilateral standards may be more blurred than has been outlined here for analytical 
purposes. Indeed, large corporations may well be involved closely in multilateral 
standard preparation (Brunsson and Jacobson, 2000, p.3), and use the opportunity to 
influence the standard according to their preferences. Gilbert and Rasche have 
suggested that multinational corporations have a disproportionate influence on standard 
setting, especially compared to “production facilities (i.e. suppliers to the 
multinationals) in developing countries that have to implement the standard.” (2007, 
p.767). Similarly, there may be unilateral standards which have been arrived at with a 
high degree of independent experts and stakeholders having an input, but we assume 
that the unilateral standard is, by its nature, partial in favour of the wishes of the 
corporation (which may of course incorporate the genuine desire to improve social 
standards). Here we will assume the extreme case that the multilateral standard has been 
arrived at predominantly by independent experts in contrast to the unilateral standard.  
 
 
 
REFRAMING THE LARGE, UNILATERAL STANDARD-SETTING 
CORPORATION AS A CORPORATE SOCIAL WATCHDOG  
 
In this section the Corporate Social Watchdog approach is introduced in more detail. 
First, a brief overview of the literature on CSR in the supply chain is given. Focussing 
on the notion of extended responsibility up the supply chain, we identify the corporate 
customer role as one of a Corporate Social Watchdog.  
 
CSR and the Supply Chain 
Standards and codes are increasingly adopted as a mechanism for regulating corporate 
behaviour (Seidl, 2007, p.706), and a framework for transmitting desirable ethical 
standards through the chain. Corporate Social Responsibility mitigates the risks in 
supply chain management (Faisal et al, 2006, p.539). If upstream suppliers are adopting 
poor management practices (in terms of labour, environmental, health and safety 
standards etc), customers risk the security and sustainability of their supply chain as 
well as their own reputations (Eltantawy, Fox and Giunipero, 2009; Roberts, 2003). 
From the perspective of enhancing social responsibility, where a company has adopted 
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social or ecological standards, purchasing can be utilised to transfer these standards to 
its suppliers. A social or ecological multiplier effect can be set in motion, which could 
achieve social change more quickly and more thoroughly than an individual company 
could achieve on its own. Purchasing practice could thus become the most efficient 
change agent within the whole organisation (Preuss, 2000, p.143). 
 
Research on supply chain social responsibility is multidisciplinary in nature and 
accordingly can be found in both the purchasing, supply chain management, logistics 
(e.g. Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Carter and Jennings, 2002; Walker and 
Brammer, 2009) and the business ethics / CSR (e.g. Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007; Van 
Tulder et al 2008) literature as well as in mainstream management (e.g. Liker and Choi, 
2004; Munson et al, 1999; Wright et al, 2007). Spence (2000) has summarised the 
literature on supply chain social responsibility, and found that key perspectives in this 
developing literature are around the pursuit of long-term stable partnerships, the 
avoidance of abuse of power differentials, balanced with the need for objectivity. This 
latter point also relates to issues around equal opportunity for different types of supplier 
resulting in supplier diversity. In relation to the requirement to comply with standards 
and extend responsibility up the supply chain, such demands can exclude for example 
small and medium sized enterprises and developing country producers from meeting 
specifications (Hamman et al, 2005), despite the fact that standards are not always 
intended for or relevant to them.  
 
Extended Responsibility 
It is the notion of extended responsibility (Spekman and Davies, 2004) which is most 
important here in the application of standards through the supply chain by the large 
corporate customer. Preuss (2000, p.152) is one of the few who engages with the 
appropriateness of extended responsibility and asks “whether the whole process of a 
company imposing criteria on suppliers, even if they are socially responsible, can lay 
claim to a moral quality or whether it simply represents an extension of buyer power 
over suppliers.” Walgenbach (2001) notes specifically that the implementation of 
ISO9000 in a supply chain has been found to act as a mechanism for both enabling and 
coercion.  Lamprecht (2000) argues that an organisation should trust the craft and 
competence of the supplier, not interfering with their practices. Demands made, often 
by multiple customers, may be incommensurate with normal operating practices 
(Spence, 2006). Suppliers, especially small ones, might not use the same tools or 
language of ethics as large firms (Pedersen, 2009), and they often have perfectly 
laudable practices in ethical terms (Murillo and Lozano, 2006). Against this backdrop 
we reframe the - no doubt in part well meaning - activities of the large corporate 
customer as emulating a watchdog role over its suppliers.  
 
Corporate Social Watchdogs? 
The implementation of extended responsibility evident in the actions of global 
corporations, we call the Corporate Social Watchdog approach (CSW). We define the 
term ‘watchdog’ to mean an individual or organisation (self- or publicly-appointed) 
which sets standards, monitors and applies sanctions to the activities of others.  It is 
drawn in a wider sense from reference to a canine which guards and warns others of 
some pre-defined wrong-doing (inefficiency, illegality, unethical or dangerous 
behaviour).  
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By way of comparison, examples of watchdogs outside of the supply chain context 
include entirely adversarial watchdogs, independent watchdogs and watchdogs with 
mixed motivations. Corporate Watch, a research and campaigning organisation on the 
social and environmental impacts of large corporations is run as a worker’s co-operative 
and comes under the category of an adversarial watchdog. This type of watchdog is 
entirely and explicitly partial and designed to undermine the activities of corporations 
wherever they don’t meet the watchdog’s agenda. A second example is the independent 
watchdog, which operates within the establishment such as the Sustainable 
Development Commission (SDC). The SDC are the UK “Government’s independent 
watchdog on sustainable development”vi.  The third use of the watchdog idea is an 
example of the mixed motive watchdog and is the one, we argue, that is most 
enlightening for CSW, which is watchdog journalism (Jakubowicz, 1989/99).  
 
Watchdog, or public, journalism puts the media in the role of representing the people 
and acting as adversaries to politicians and large corporations by revealing truth and 
striving for justice.  This model of journalism incorporates the role of a “watchdog in 
order to control the authorities” (Carpentier, 2007, p. 158.). Carpentier goes on to note 
the potential purposeful avoidance of objectivity in public (or civic) journalism, 
highlighting the “area of tension between involvement and neutrality” (p.160) which we 
similarly see in the account of the Corporate Social Watchdog approach presented here. 
Further supporting the evidence for parallels with CSW, in a typology of media effects, 
McQuail (1987, p.85) notes the effect of ideological stances of the media as resulting in 
social control, socialization, reality definition and institutional change – all aspects 
which we would also expect to see result from CSW activities.   
 
Furthermore, large corporations in the supply chain not only are justifiably labelled as 
Corporate Social Watchdogs but are what might be called watchdogs ‘with teeth’, 
because of their power over those they ‘watch’ (i.e. their suppliers) to dictate the CSR 
standard or code which must be adhered to, monitor compliance and apply sanctions. In 
Figure 1 the case for the social dynamic of corporations applying their chosen standards 
to the supply chain as watchdogs is illustrated. 
 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
Hence the Corporate Social Watchdog combines the roles of regulator, policer and 
judge of ethical standards in the supply chain. While the proposed standards are 
presented as voluntary (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000, p.9), the customer retains the 
power ultimately to de-list and expose any organisation not seen to meet the dictated 
standard. At the extreme, it may be viewed that the corporation takes a paternalistic 
degree of moral responsibility for the suppliers, acting in loco parentis, almost as if they 
were subsidiaries of the corporation. Automotive manufacturer Toyota is renowned for 
such close relationships with its suppliers, for example (see Spence, 2006). This 
approach may be motivated by good will, but is also in the enlightened self-interest of 
the corporation. 
 
The Corporate Social Watchdog approach is an important one because it identifies and 
highlights the social effects of the power and control held by large corporate customers 
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over their suppliers. In the CSW approach the relationship between the corporation and 
its suppliers becomes a dominant focus of consideration. Cox (2004) has noted that 
despite a rhetoric of partnership and win-win situations in supply chains, power 
differences remain a deeply-set issue.  
 
At a more conceptual level, there are parallels between CSW and the notion of cultural 
imperialism or homogenization, effectively regulating culture (Tomlinson, 1997, p. 
119). This is especially pertinent where suppliers are located in a different cultural 
context. In this respect the requirement for compliance with unilaterally determined and 
culturally embedded standards by a corporate customer can be understood as a cultural 
imposition of social responsibility standards. While this point requires further 
consideration, CSW does incorporate a dominating element of consistent influence and 
control of the large corporate customer on its suppliers. Again this is particularly 
important in the context of globalisation wherein, as Anthony Giddens reminds us, 
“(g)lobalisation is widely seen in the developing world as merely the latest stage in the 
exploitation of the third world by the West – a project from which the rich countries 
gain at the expense of the poor” (Giddens, 2003, pp.xx).  In this case, the large 
corporation acts as a social watchdog, imposing unilateral standards in part at least in 
order to protect its own reputation. Bannerjee (2007, pp.66-93) points out in scathing 
terms the inequity and hypocrisy of Western corporate imposition of sustainability and 
CSR requirements on developing countries, when the Western context enjoyed a lack of 
these constraints in its developing phase. 
 
RESEARCH AGENDA  
 
We have argued that large corporate customers take on the role of a Corporate Social 
Watchdog when they choose to act upon their implied (by society and the media) 
extended responsibility for their supply chain. We are particularly interested in the case 
where the social responsibility standard set, which should be replicated throughout the 
chain, is unilaterally determined. While CSW still can be observed where multilaterally 
agreed standards are adopted, one element of the control which CSW organisations 
maintain has been forfeited, i.e. the specificity of the standards required – and hence the 
opportunity to fit them explicitly to organisational needs. We propose a range of 
avenues for research into the Corporate Social Watchdog phenomenon. 
 
The first thing to understand in more detail is the factors which influence a corporation 
to take the decision to institutionalize the extension of its supply chain responsibility. 
While presumably up until that point they may well be held accountable for their supply 
chain’s activities, they also retain an element of ‘plausible deniability’. Once it is clear 
that the corporation has taken steps to take active responsibility for their supply chain 
members, there is no opportunity to hide behind this arms-length approach to social 
responsibility. Hence, to what extent are the drivers coming from social expectations as 
translated by the media, customers, keeping up with competitors, financial drivers (risk 
mitigation), social drivers? Furthermore, what are the moral implications of self-
appointment as the moral arbitrator on social practices for a company’s suppliers? 
Suppliers may consider this to be interference in their practices and indeed be offended 
at the implied criticism of their social credentials. Indeed, in practice the standards may 
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be inappropriate since they tend not to be written with (often) small suppliers in mind. 
This needs further investigation. 
 
As with the wider research on standards, it would be useful to understand the process 
and influences on the formation of standard setting. Is it, as might cynically be assumed, 
simply a paper exercise led by the Corporate Social Responsibility department in 
isolation, or is their wider input from throughout the organisation? Given the emphasis 
on dialogue approaches to standard setting supported by Gilbert and Rasche (2007), is a 
wide spread stakeholder dialogue approach in evidence? Following on from these, how 
do different approaches to formulating the standard influence their content and 
successful application?  
 
Once initial steps have been taken to ensure that suppliers comply with the chosen 
standard, what is the impact on practices? Is there a difference in this between 
multilateral and unilateral agreements? Are suppliers more motivated to follow one 
rather than another? From their point of view, any changes they need to make to follow 
a unilateral standard may only be relevant for that customer. Unless the supplier solely 
supplies that firm – which in itself is ethically questionable (Spence, 2006) -  the 
efficiency of making changes may be lost. If all customers are requiring that the same 
standard be followed, then there is some economy of scale to be derived for the 
supplier.  
 
As Seidl (2007) has noted, standards are built to embrace a degree of flexibility. Given 
that unilateral standards have been written with a specific case in mind, is it the case 
that this flexibility is reduced compared to more generic multilaterally determined 
standards? To what extent do corporations in practice require compliance with the 
standard? Under what circumstances is non-compliance accepted (for example, where 
the supplier is the sole producer of a given product, where there is a long standing 
special relationship, for micro firms etc)? 
 
Furthermore, what happens when there is a clear violation of a social standard which 
has been implemented in a supply chain, what sanctions are applied in practice and how 
is the public relations perspective handled? Dhanarajan (2005, p.529) argues that 
“(s)imply mitigating negative impacts through castigating intermediaries or suppliers 
does not contribute to sustainable solutions”. Thus, ultimately, to what extent does the 
application and extended control of unilateral standards influence the social 
responsibility of organisations? 
 
Finally there are also practical and moral implications for the Corporate Social 
Watchdog concept. While public outcry when there is a problem in the supply chain 
effectively gives large corporate customers extended social responsibility for the actions 
of their suppliers, this in practice is incredibly difficult to control for. In this paper we 
have focused on first tier suppliers only. In practice compliance with a unilateral 
standard may be required for second, third, fourth or higher tier suppliers. It would be 
extraordinarily resource-intensive to control suppliers beyond the first level in this way, 
so what practical approach might mitigate the wider risk? On the other hand, 
corporations might question their right and whether it is morally just to take the 
implicitly imperialist approach of the Corporate Social Watchdog? While this moral 
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high ground could also be used as an excuse for not taking wider responsibility than in-
house operations, it might also hold considerable truth. On what moral basis does one 
organisation seek to determine the social practices of another? Indeed, are corporate 
customers better equipped to determine social responsibility? Are they more ethical in a 
sense, than their suppliers? 
 
In conclusion, our focus on unilaterally derived standards and the implication for supply 
chains in which they are applied - and required – offers a new perspective on the social 
dynamics of standards. The concept of the Corporate Social Watchdog warrants further 
investigation. As things stand, we are unavoidably drawn back to Milton Friedman’s 
(1970), now rather passé, adage that corporations and their managers are not qualified to 
make social and ethical decisions. While this perspective has been much critiqued, the 
extension of the reach and impact of the social and ethical opinions and decisions of a 
corporation’s managers is much magnified where compliance with a unilateral standard 
is applied through a supply chain. This brings us ultimately to the deeply ethical 
question of the appropriate moral reach and limits of the modern multinational 
corporation. It is in this context which we believe the Corporate Social Watchdog 
approach, and the process around the unilaterally derived standard, are of most 
significance.  
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TABLES 
 
Table I: Differences between multilateral and unilateral social responsibility 
standards 
 Multilateral standard Unilateral standard 
Drivers Social improvement Multiple: Risk mitigation, 
customer expectations, 
regulation avoidance, social 
improvement.  
Mandate Global movement Self-appointed, consequence of 
power over suppliers. 
Purpose To align practices 
according to social 
expectations 
To align supplier practices 
according to company 
expectations (influenced by 
social expectations) 
Compiled by Range of expertsvii  In-house (possibly some 
external advisors) 
Content Cross-sectoral. 
Single standard.  
Company (and sector) specific. 
Likely to be a combination of 
several standards.  
Relevant to? Potentially all organisations All suppliers and aspiring 
suppliers. Potentially second, 
third, fourth tier etc. suppliers. 
Degree of 
Institutionalization/ 
voluntarism 
Independent of the standard 
setter 
Dependent on the standard 
setter (full compliance a 
possible requirement). Suppliers 
can self-select out of the process 
but risk losing that customer.   
Role in 
monitoring/auditing? 
None Critical. May appoint and direct 
independent auditors or carry 
out own auditing. 
Sanctions available None Public/Industry exposure; 
Delisting; Repeated auditing; 
Engagement and co-operation; 
Dialogue and reassessment of 
requirements. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The Role of the Corporate Social Watchdog in relation to Unilateral 
Standards Implementation in its Supply Chain  
SELF-APPOINT AS A WATCHDOG: Decision to extend social responsibility 
through the supply chain reached DETERMINE ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR: 
Create a unilateral standard  ENHANCE CREDIBILITY: Ensure corporation’s 
own compliance with the standard (risk mitigation and legitimacy)  
COMMUNICATE EXPECTATIONS: Issue instructions for supplier/potential 
supplier compliance   MONITOR: Assess compliance of supplier/potential supplier 
(initial survey) Audit or instruct auditors to assess compliance in more detail as 
appropriate (risk driven)  Determine corrective measures where necessary  Assess 
the efficacy of corrective measures   DETERMINE SANCTION: Either 
continue/begin supplier relationship or do not embark on relationship/delist the supplier 
  Determine time frame to periodically return to ‘’ and iterate the process . 
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